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Abstract
We investigate the problem in which an agent has to find an object that moves
between two locations according to a discrete Markov process (see Pollock, 1970).
At every period, the agent has three options: searching left, searching right, and
waiting. We assume that waiting is costless whereas searching is costly. Waiting
can be useful because it could induce a more favorable probability distribution
over the two locations next period. We find an essentially unique (nearly) optimal
strategy, and prove that it is characterized by two thresholds (as conjectured by
Weber, 1986). We show, moreover, that it can never be optimal to search the
location with the lower probability of containing the object. The latter result is
far from obvious and is in clear contrast with the example in Ross (1983) for the
model without waiting.
We also analyze the case of multiple agents. This makes the problem a
more strategic one, since now the agents not only compete against time but also
against each other in finding the object. We find diﬀerent kinds of subgame
perfect equilibria, possibly containing strategies that are not optimal in the one-
agent case. We compare the various equilibria in terms of cost-eﬀectiveness.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Description of the Problem without Waiting
In 1970, Pollock considered the following search problem: there is an object moving
across two locations labeled as L (left) and R (right) according to a discrete time
Markov process (see Figure 1).
L R
q
r
1-q 1-r
Figure 1: Search For a Moving Target
Hence, if the object currently is at L, it will move to R with probability q. If the
object currently is at R, it will move to L with probability r. The probabilities q and
r are called the transition probabilities. The probability that the object is initially at
L is p, and hence 1− p is the probability that the object initially is at R.
The periods at which the agent can search for the object are denoted by t =
1, 2, 3, ... As soon as the agent finds the object, the process stops. If the object has
not yet been found, the agent has two possible actions at any given period: searching
left (L) and searching right (R), which have costs cL and cR, respectively. Assume
that the object is overlooked with probability αL if it is located at L and the agent
searches L, and overlooked with probability αR if it is located at R and the agent
searches R. The objective is to minimize the total expected searching cost needed
for finding the object.
1.2 Overview of the Literature
Ross (1983) conjectured that there exists an optimal searching strategy of the follow-
ing form: search L at period t if and only if pt ≥ π, where pt is the probability that
the object is located at L at period t. Here, π is a threshold, which depends on the
parameters of the model (i.e., q,r, and p). Although this conjecture was intuitive, it
has never been proven in full generality until now.
Pollock (1970) showed that the conjecture is valid for the special case without
overlooking (i.e., αL = αR = 0) in the discrete time model. He also computed the
threshold eπ for every possible configuration of parameters. Weber (1986) proved
Ross’ conjecture for a continuous time Markov process, including the possibility of
overlooking. He also conjectured that for the case with waiting, the optimal strategy
can be characterized by two thresholds. Later, MacPhee and Jordan (1995) proved
Ross’ conjecture for a discrete time Markov process with the possibility of overlooking,
but only for some parameter configurations.
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Assaf and Sharlin-Bilitzky (1994) investigated a continuous time version of the
model in which the agent, in addition, can specify the searching eﬀort. The main
result of the paper is to describe the optimal searching strategy in this model. Kan
(1977) investigated the search problem above with the additional option to stop
searching. The paper characterized optimal strategies for specific classes of transition
probabilities.
1.3 Our Contribution
Our paper extends the original search problem by introducing the option to wait.1
That is, at every period the agent has now three options: searching left (L), searching
right (R), and waiting (0). We assume that waiting is costless whereas searching
is costly. This extension is motivated by the fact that an agent can benefit from
waiting by getting a more favorable probability distribution over the two locations
next period.
We assume that the costs of searching left and right are equal (normalized to 1)
and the overlooking probabilities are 0. If the agent finds the object he receives a
prize P . Provided the prize is high enough, this gives the agent an incentive to find
the object with probability 1. Without this prize, it would be optimal to simply wait
forever.
We prove that, if P ≥ 2 and the sum of the transition probabilities (i.e., q + r)
is at least 1, or q = r, then there exists an optimal strategy of the following form:
search R if pt ∈ [0, π1], wait if pt ∈ (π1, π2) and search L if pt ∈ [π2, 1]. (Recall that
pt denotes the probability that the object is at location L at period t, given it has
not been found yet.) That is, this optimal strategy is given by two thresholds, π1
and π2, as conjectured by Weber (1986). Moreover, this optimal strategy is unique
up to the choices at π1 and π2.
On the other hand, if P ≥ 2 and 0 < q+ r < 1 and q 6= r, we prove that for every
ε > 0 there exists an ε-optimal strategy of the form described above. By an ε-optimal
strategy we mean that the agent cannot improve his expected utility by more than
ε by switching to another strategy. In this case, an optimal strategy need not exist
since there are situations in which waiting for one more period always provides more
favorable probabilities pt and 1−pt for the next period. In these situations, the agent
wants to postpone searching as long as possible.
We show that our thresholds π1 and π2 have an interesting relationship with the
threshold eπ as derived by Pollock for the model without waiting: It turns out that eπ
is always in between π1 and π2. Consequently, if the agent searches a location in the
model with waiting, he would search the same location in the model without waiting.
Although this result is not unexpected, it is not immediately clear why it should be
the case.
In the model without the option to wait, Ross (1983) has shown that it is possible
that searching the location with the lower probability of containing the object is
1Note that waiting is diﬀerent from stopping analyzed in Kan (1977). The agent can continue
searching after waiting, whereas stopping means no more search can be done.
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optimal. The reason is that searching this location may induce a very favorable
probability distribution for the location of the object next time, in case it is not
found. We show that this is no longer possible in our model: the agent either searches
the location with the higher probability of containing the object, or he waits. So,
even if the lower probability is close to 12 , and searching the location with the lower
probability would provide the agent with complete certainty next period, he would
still not search that location. This fact is far from obvious.
As another extension, we analyze the case of multiple agents. This extension
makes the problem a more strategic one, since now the agents not only compete
against time but also against each other in finding the object. In that sense, this
extension embeds the two frequently studied objectives in the literature: minimizing
the expected cost of finding the object and maximizing the probability of finding the
object in a given time.2 In particular, we assume that if agent i is the first one to
find the object, possibly at the same time as some of his opponents, then his utility
would be equal to some prize P ≥ 2 (for finding the object first) minus his total
searching cost. If he does not find the object first, he will not receive the prize P but
still incurs the cost of searching. Hence, each agent wants to minimize his expected
search cost and also maximize his probability of finding it in a given time.
We show that, if P ≥ 2, there are multiple subgame perfect equilibria in this
search game. There is a symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium in which every
agent follows the single-agent optimal strategy. There is another symmetric subgame
perfect equilibrium, however, in which every agent searches the location with the
higher probability of containing the object. If the prize is high enough, there is
even a symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium in which every agent always searches
the location with the lowest probability of containing the object. We show that
the equilibrium in which every agent plays his one-person optimal strategy Pareto
dominates all other symmetric equilibria.
1.4 Road Map
Section 2 of this paper introduces the necessary notation and presents our main
theorem along with the values of the thresholds π1 and π2. Section 3 introduces
the value function and analyzes its properties, which we use in the proof of the
main theorem. Section 4 discusses all diﬀerent types of Markov processes. Section 5
contains preparatory lemmas for the proof of the main theorem. Section 6 contains
two lemmas which prove the existence of the thresholds for all possible types of
Markov processes. In Section 7, we compute the values of the thresholds π1 and
π2 (see Table 1). In Section 8, we compare our optimal strategy with the optimal
strategy for the model without waiting, as derived by Pollock (1970). In Section 9
we introduce the model with multiple agents and analyze the equilibria of the search
game. Section 10 provides a discussion of the assumptions of the model, as well as a
comparison of the results from diﬀerent models.
2See, for instance, Kan (1977) or Pursiheimo (1978).
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2 Main Theorem
2.1 Optimal and ε-Optimal Strategies
A strategy γ is defined as a sequence (γt)t∈N, where γt ∈ {L,R, 0} describes the
action to be taken at period t if the object has not been found yet.3 The expected
utility induced by a strategy γ is denoted by U(γ), while the expected searching cost
is called C(γ). Thus, U(γ) = µ(γ)P −C(γ), where µ(γ) is the probability of finding
the object.
We now mention some specific classes of strategies. We call a strategy γ successful
if µ(γ) = 1. In that case, U(γ) = P − C(γ). For every period t, let µt(γ) be the
probability of finding the object at period t, given that it has not been found yet.
Also, let Ct(γ) be the cost at period t (so, Ct(γ) = 1 if the agent searches, and 0 if
he waits). We call the strategy γ loss-free if µt(γ)P − Ct(γ) ≥ 0 for every period t,
meaning that at every period the expected utility is non-negative. Moreover, we call
γ strictly loss-free if µt(γ)P − Ct(γ) > 0 for every period t at which γ prescribes to
search.
Formally, the agent’s objective is to find, for a given configuration (p¯, q, r) of initial
and transition probabilities, a strategy γ that maximizes the expected utility, U(γ).
A strategy γ is called optimal if U(γ) ≥ U(γ0) for all other strategies γ0. For any
ε > 0, the strategy γ is called ε-optimal if U(γ) ≥ U(γ0)−ε for all other strategies γ0.
As we will show below, optimal strategies do not always exist for every configuration
of initial and transition probabilities, but for every ε > 0 we can always construct an
ε-optimal strategy.
We will show that, if P ≥ 2, then it is suﬃcient to consider successful strategies.
Lemma 2.1 Let P ≥ 2, and let γ be an arbitrary strategy. Then, there is a successful
strategy γ0 with U(γ0) ≥ U(γ).
Proof. Suppose that γ is not successful. For every period t, let zt(γ) be the con-
ditional probability that the object will be found from period t on, given that the
object has not been found before t. We will show that zt(γ) tends to 0 as t→∞.
Note that z1(γ) is simply the probability that the object will eventually be found.
So, by assumption, z1(γ) < 1. Let z¯t(γ) be the probability that the object will be
found before period t. Then,
z1(γ) = z¯t(γ) + (1− z¯t(γ))zt(γ)
for all t. Since z¯t(γ)→ z1(γ) as t→∞, and 1− z¯t(γ)→ 1− z1(γ) > 0 as t→∞, we
have that zt(γ)→ 0 as t→∞.
So, there is some period t with zt(γ) ≤ 1P . This implies that from period t on the
expected continuation utility for γ is at most 0. The reason is that either γ does not
search after t, yielding a continuation utility of 0, or searches at least once, yielding
a continuation utility of at most 1P P − 1 = 0.
3We do not consider mixed or history dependent strategies here, since the agent will not be able
to improve upon his cost by turning to such strategies.
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Now, let γ0 be the strategy that coincides with γ during the first t − 1 periods,
and which from period t on always searches the location with the highest current
probability of containing the object. (If both locations are equally likely, check L).
Then, γ0will find the object with probability 1, so is a successful strategy. Suppose
that the object has not been found before period t. Then it can be shown by induction
on k that the expected searching cost until period t+ k will be at most 1 + 12 +
1
4 +
...+ 1
2k−1
≤ 2. Therefore, the expected continuation searching cost for γ0 from period
t on is at most 2. So, the expected continuation utility for γ0 from period t on is at
least 0, as P ≥ 2. But then, U(γ0) ≥ U(γ).
It thus follows that, if P ≥ 2, we may restrict ourselves to successful strategies.
This is useful since finding an optimal strategy within the class of successful strategies
is equivalent to minimizing the expected searching costs.
The prize, P , should be at least 2 to make the agent search. If P < 2, the agent
may find it optimal to wait forever since the benefit from finding the object does not
cover the expected costs of search in some cases. Consider, for instance, the situation
where the initial probability p¯ is 12 , and the transition probabilities q and r are
1
2
as well. In that case, the expected cost of finding the object would be exactly 2.4
Hence, the agent would have no incentive to search at all.
2.2 Our Main Theorem
Our main theorem states that, whatever configuration of initial probabilities and
transition probabilities we take, we can always construct a (nearly) optimal strategy
of the following kind:
• if the probability that the object is at L is below a threshold π1, search R;
• if the probability that the object is at L is between π1 and another threshold
π2 ≥ π1, wait;
• if the probability that the object is at L is above π2, search L.
The (nearly) optimal strategy is therefore completely characterized by the thresh-
olds π1 and π2. It is possible that the two thresholds coincide. In that case, the agent
will never wait.
In the main theorem, let pt(γ) be the probability that at period t the object is
at L if strategy γ is being implemented5. Note that pt(γ) can easily be computed
from γ: If at period t − 1 action L has been chosen, then pt(γ) = r. Namely, if by
choosing L the object has not been found at period t− 1, then the object must have
been at R at period t− 1, and hence will be at L with probability r next period. By
4The reason is that at every period, if the object has not yet been found, the probabilities of
the object being located at L and R would be exactly 1
2 . So, the expected searching cost will be
1
2
· 1 + 1
4
· 2 + 1
8
· 3 + ... = 2.
5From now on, whenever we speak about period t, we always assume that the object has not been
found before this period.
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π1 π2
q + r = 0 12
1
2
0 < q + r < 1 and
(q + 1)r2 + q2r − q ≤ 0
(Area A in Figure 2)
q(1+r)
(q+r)(1+q)
(unique p with V (p,R) = V (π∗, L))
max{12 , rq+r − αε2 }
0 < q + r < 1 and
(q + 1)r2 + q2r − q > 0
(Area B in Figure 2)
q
(q+r)(1+q)−q
(unique p with V (p,R) = V (π∗, L))
max{12 , rq+r − αε2 }
q + r = 1 q r
1 < q + r < 2 and
(1− q + q2)r − 2q2 + q3 ≤ 0
(Area C in Figure 2)
q(1−r)
(q+r)(1−q)
(unique p with V (p,R) = V (Ap,L))
r
q+r
1 < q + r < 2 and
(1− q + q2)r − 2q2 + q3 > 0
(Area D in Figure 2)
1−r
(q+r)(1−q)+1−r
(unique p with V (p,R) = V (Ap,L))
r
q+r
q + r = 2 12
1
2
Table 1: Values for the thresholds π1 and π2 when q ≤ r. If q < r then α is the
smallest positive probability amongst p, 1− p, q, 1− q, r, and 1− r. If q = r, then
α = 0.
a similar reasoning, if at period t− 1 action R has been chosen, then pt(γ) = 1− q.
If at period t− 1 action 0 has been chosen, then
pt(γ) = pt−1(γ)(1− q) + (1− pt−1(γ))r.
Theorem 2.2 Let P ≥ 2. Take a configuration (p¯, q, r) of initial and transition prob-
abilities with q ≤ r, let ε > 0, and choose the thresholds π1 and π2 according to Table
1. Then, the strategy γ given by
γt =
⎧
⎨
⎩
R, if pt(γ) ∈ [0, π1]
0, if pt(γ) ∈ (π1, π2)
L, if pt(γ) ∈ [π2, 1]
is an ε-optimal strategy.6 Moreover, if q = r or q + r ≥ 1, then γ is an optimal
strategy, unique up to the choices at π1 and π2.
In addition, γ is successful and prescribes to search a location only if the probability
that the object is at that location is at least 12 . In particular, γ is loss-free.
6 In fact, the strategy is ε-optimal from any period on.
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Figure 2: Diﬀerent areas of (q, r) pairs considered in Theorem 2.2
Figure 2 provides a graphical illustration of the various areas of (q, r) pairs we
distinguish in the theorem. Note that the assumption q ≤ r is made without loss of
generality. If q < r and q + r ∈ (0, 1), then there are initial probabilities p¯ for which
no optimal strategy exists. However, we can still guarantee the existence of ε-optimal
strategies in this case.
In Table 1, the parts between brackets will only become clear after reading Section
3.2. For our main theorem, any eα such that 0 < eα < α would also do in case q < r.
It will follow from our analysis that our thresholds π1 and π2 have an interesting
relationship with the threshold eπ as computed by Pollock for the model without
waiting: It turns out that eπ is always in between π1 and π2. Consequently, if the
agent searches a location in the model with waiting, he would search the same location
in the model without waiting. Although this result may seem intuitive, it is not
immediate.
The proof of Theorem 2.2 is structured as follows. Section 3 introduces the
value function and analyzes its properties, which is fundamental for the proof of the
main theorem. Section 4 discusses all diﬀerent types of Markov processes. Section 5
contains preparatory lemmas for the proof of the main theorem. Section 6 contains
two lemmas which prove the existence of the thresholds and show that the induced
strategies are successful. We also show that these thresholds are unique if q = r
or q + r ≥ 1. Consequently, we prove for these cases the uniqueness of the optimal
strategy, up to the choices at the two thresholds. In Section 7, we compute the values
of the thresholds π1 and π2 (see Table 1), and show that the induced strategy only
searches a location if the object is there with probability at least 12 .
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3 Value Function
3.1 Definition
The key concept in the proof of our main theorem is that of a value function. Fix
some transition probabilities q and r. Suppose that the object is located at L with
probability p. Then, for every strategy γ we denote by C(p, γ) the expected cost of
finding the object if γ is used. The value V (p) is given by
V (p) = inf
γ successful
C(p, γ)
and denotes the minimal expected cost of finding the object if the object is currently
located at L with probability p. The function that assigns to every p the number
V (p) is called the value function. Hence, if a successful strategy γ is optimal for the
configuration (p¯, q, r), then C(p¯, γ) = V (p). Conversely, if P ≥ 2 and γ is successful
with C(p¯, γ) = V (p), then, in view of Lemma 2.1, γ is optimal.
3.2 Basic Properties of the Value Function
For each action a ∈ {L,R, 0}, we define the expected cost V (p, a) induced by using
action a, given that the agent behaves optimally afterwards. As before, let p denote
the probability that the object is currently at L.
When the agent searches L, then with probability p he finds the object and his
total cost will be 1, while with probability (1−p) he cannot find it. In case he cannot
find it, he searched already once, and will have a future expected cost of V (r) if he
acts optimally from next period on. Therefore, the expected cost of searching L can
be written as
V (p, L) = p · 1 + (1− p) [1 + V (r)] = 1 + (1− p)V (r). (1)
Similarly, the expected cost of searching R is
V (p,R) = (1− p) · 1 + p [1 + V (1− q)] = 1 + pV (1− q). (2)
Finally, the expected cost of waiting is
V (p, 0) = V (Ap), (3)
where
Ap := p(1− q) + (1− p)r = (1− q − r)p+ r (4)
denotes the probability that the object will be at L in the next period, if the object
is currently at L with probability p.
Therefore, the value function satisfies
V (p) = min{V (p, L), V (p,R), V (p, 0)}.
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An action a ∈ {L,R, 0} with V (p, a) = V (p) is called an optimal action at p. More-
over, for a given ε > 0 we say that action a is ε-optimal at p if V (p, a) ≤ V (p) + ε.
As it can be seen from the equations above, V (p, L), V (p,R) and Ap are all
linear in p. Moreover, V (p, L) is strictly monotone decreasing in p, whereas V (p,R)
is strictly monotone increasing in p. Combining this with the fact that V (p,R) attains
its minimum, which is equal to 1, at p = 0 and V (p, L) attains its minimum, which
is equal to 1, at p = 1, we can conclude that V (p, L) and V (p,R) always intersect at
a unique π ∈ (0, 1), which is given by the equation
π =
V (r)
V (1− q) + V (r) . (5)
Hence,
V (p, L) > V (p,R) for all p ∈ [0, π)
V (p, L) = V (p,R) at p = π
V (p, L) < V (p,R) for all p ∈ (π, 1] .
Figure 3 provides a graphical representation of the functions V (p, L) and V (p,R).
0 1
1
PPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPP 1
V (p, L)
©©
©©
©©
©©
©©
©©
©©
©©
©V (p,R)
π
Figure 3: Functions V (p, L) and V (p,R)
We denote the invariant distribution(s) of the Markov process by (π∗, 1−π∗). In
particular, π∗ is a solution of the equation
Aπ∗ = π∗ ⇔ (1− q − r)π∗ + r = π∗.
If q + r > 0, then this equation has a unique solution which is
π∗ =
r
q + r
. (6)
In the following lemma we list some general properties of the value function that
will be useful for the proof of the main theorem.
10
Lemma 3.1 The value function V (p) satisfies the following properties;
(i) 1 ≤ V (p) ≤ 2, and V (p) = 1 ⇔ p = 0 or p = 1.
(ii) V (p) = inf
n∈{0,1,...}
min{V (Anp, L), V (Anp,R)}.
(iii) V (π∗) = min{V (π∗, L), V (π∗, R)} if q + r > 0.
(iv) V (p) ≤ V (Anp) ∀n ∈ N, and V (p) ≤ V (π∗) if 0 < q + r < 2.
(v) V (1− q) ≤ 1q if q > 0 and V (r) ≤
1
r if r > 0.
Proof. (i) It is clear that V (p) ≥ 1 and V (p) = 1 ⇔ p = 0 or p = 1. It remains to
prove that V (p) ≤ 2. Consider the strategy γ which, at every period t, searches the
location that contains the object with the highest probability (if both locations are
equally likely, check L). Then, by the proof of Lemma 2.1, we know that C(p, γ) ≤ 2,
yielding V (p) ≤ 2.
(ii) Since V (p) restricts to successful strategies, the agent can only wait for a
finite number of periods in a row, after which L or R has to be chosen.
(iii) This follows from (ii) and the fact that Anπ∗ = π∗ for every n.
(iv) By definition, V (p) ≤ V (p, 0) = V (Ap). Applying transformation A recur-
sively, we get
V (p) ≤ V (Ap) ≤ V (A2p) ≤ ... ≤ V (An−1p) ≤ V (Anp)
for every n.
Since 0 < q + r < 2, the sequence Anp converges to π∗. By (ii), V (p) is
continuous in p, and hence we have that V (Anp) converges to V (π∗). Therefore,
V (p) ≤ limn→∞ V (Anp) = V (π∗).
(v) We have V (1− q) ≤ V (1− q,R) = 1 + (1− q)V (1− q). Hence, if q > 0, this
implies
V (1− q) ≤ 1
q
.
Similarly, one can show that V (r) ≤ 1r , if r > 0.
4 Five Possible Types of Dynamics
We distinguish 5 diﬀerent types of dynamics in the Markov process, induced by the
transition probabilities q and r.
(i) Absorbing case: q + r = 0 i.e. q = r = 0.
Object does not move in this case. Function Ap is given by Ap = p. Invariant
distribution π∗ is not unique. In fact, any π∗ ∈ [0, 1] is invariant.
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-
n
0.6
6
Anp
0 1 2 3 4 5
• • • • •
Figure 4: Dynamics for the first five iterations for p = 0.6, q = r = 0.
(ii) Non-oscillating case: 0 < q + r < 1.
Function Ap is strictly increasing in p. Invariant distribution π∗ is unique. Prob-
abilities Ap and p are always on the same side of π∗. That is, Anp converges to π∗ in
a monotonic (and hence non-oscillating) fashion.
-
n
π∗ = 0.66 . . .
6
Anp
0 1 2 3 4 5
•
•
• •
•
(1, 0.66)
(2, 0.666)
(3, 0.6666)
(4, 0.66666)
(5, 0.666666)
Figure 5: Dynamics for the first five iterations for p = 0.6, q = 0.3 and r = 0.6.
(iii) State independent transitions case: q + r = 1.
FunctionAp is constant in p. Invariant distribution π∗ is unique. The convergence
to π∗ is immediate. Since r = 1− q, the transitions are independent of the state.
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-
n
π∗ = 0.8
6
Anp
0 1 2 3 4 5
• • • • •
Figure 6: Dynamics for the first five iterations for p = 0.6, q = 0.2 and r = 0.8.
(iv) Oscillating case: 1 < q + r < 2.
Function Ap is strictly decreasing in p. Invariant distribution π∗ is unique.
Probabilities Ap and p are always on diﬀerent sides of π∗. So, Anp converges to π∗ in
an oscillating fashion although |Anp− π∗| is a strictly decreasing function of n ∈ N.
-
n
π∗ = 0.6428
6
Anp
0 1 2 3 4 5
•
•
•
• •
(1, 0.66)
(2, 0.636)
(3, 0.6456)
(4, 0.6418)
(5, 0.6433)
Figure 7: Dynamics for the first five iterations for p = 0.6, q = 0.5 and r = 0.9.
(v) Switching case: q + r = 2 i.e. q = r = 1.
Function Ap is given by Ap = 1−p. Invariant distribution π∗ is unique and equal
to 12 . By waiting, the probability that the object is at L switches from p to 1 − p.
So, unless p = π∗, there will be no convergence to π∗.
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Figure 8: Dynamics for the first five iterations for p = 0.6, q = r = 1.
5 Preparatory Lemmas
In order to prove our main theorem, we first show that a sequence of optimal actions,
under mild conditions, always leads to an optimal strategy.
Lemma 5.1 Let γ be a strategy which never waits infinitely long. Let pt(γ) be the
probability that at period t the object is located at L if the object has not been found
yet, and strategy γ is being implemented. Suppose that there is an α > 0 such that
L is chosen only if pt(γ) ≥ α, and R is chosen only if 1 − pt(γ) ≥ α. Then, γ is
successful and
(1) if every action γt is optimal at pt(γ) then strategy γ is optimal;
(2) for every ε > 0 and δ ∈ [0, αε], if every action γt ∈ {L,R} is δ-optimal at pt(γ)
and every action γt = 0 is optimal at pt(γ), then strategy γ is ε-optimal.
Proof. Since γ never waits infinitely long, it can be described as follows: First, wait
until period w1, then search location a1 ∈ {L,R}, then wait until period w2, then
search location a2, and so on. For k = 1, 2, 3, ... define
zk :=
½
pwk(γ), if ak = L
1− pwk(γ), if ak = R.
From now on, we will write pt instead of pt(γ). Hence, zk denotes the probability
that the object will be found by action ak at period wk, if the object has not been
found yet, and strategy γ is being implemented. Note that, by our assumption in the
lemma, zk ≥ α for all k.
We now show that γ is successful. The probability that γ never finds the object
is Πk≥1(1 − zk). Since zk ≥ α for all k, we have that 1 − zk ≤ 1 − α < 1. Hence,
Πk≥1(1− zk) = 0, yielding that γ is successful.
We now prove (1) and (2) by showing that for every ε ≥ 0, if δ ∈ [0, αε], every
action γt ∈ {L,R} is δ-optimal at pt(γ), and every action γt = 0 is optimal at pt(γ),
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then strategy γ is ε-optimal. Part (1) would then follow by taking ε = 0, and part
(2) would follow by taking ε > 0.
Choose ε ≥ 0 and δ ∈ [0, αε]. Suppose now that at every period t every action
γt ∈ {L,R} is δ-optimal for pt(γ), and every action γt = 0 is optimal at pt(γ). We
will show that γ is an ε-optimal strategy, i.e. C(p¯, γ) ≤ V (p¯) + ε, where p¯ is the
initial probability that the object is at L.
For every period t, let γt be the continuation strategy from period t onwards.
Then,
C(p¯, γ) = z1 · 1 + (1− z1)
£
1 + C(pw1+1, γ
w1+1)
¤
,
since the object will be found at period w1 with probability z1, while with probability
1−z1 the continuation strategy γw1+1 would be played after period w1. On the other
hand,
V (p¯) = V (pw1) ≥ V (pw1 , a1)− δ = z1 · 1 + (1− z1) [1 + V (pw1+1)]− δ.
Here, the first equality follows from the fact that waiting until period w1 is a sequence
of optimal actions, and the inequality follows from the assumption that a1 is a δ-
optimal action at period w1. The last equality follows from (1) and (2). Therefore,
V (p¯)− C(p¯, γ) ≥ (1− z1)
£
V (pw1+1)− C(pw1+1, γw1+1)
¤
− δ,
and by induction it would follow that
V (p¯)− C(p¯, γ) ≥ (1− z1) · ... · (1− zk)
£
V (pwk+1)− C(pwk+1, γwk+1)
¤
(7)
−δ [1 + (1− z1) + ...+ (1− z1) · · · (1− zk−1)]
for k = 1, 2, 3...
We will show that V (p¯)−C(p¯, γ) ≥ −ε, which would imply that γ is an ε-optimal
strategy. We already know that Πk≥1(1− zk) = 0. Hence, it is suﬃcient to show that
(i) V (pwk+1)− C(pwk+1, γwk+1) is uniformly bounded, and
(ii) δ [1 + (1− z1) + ...+ (1− z1) · · · (1− zk−1)] ≤ ε
for all k.
(i) Since, by Lemma 3.1 (i), 1 ≤ V (pwk+1) ≤ 2, it remains to prove that
C(pwk+1, γ
wk+1) is uniformly bounded.
As zk ≥ α for all k, it holds that
C(pwk+1, γ
wk+1) ≤ α · 1 + (1− α) · α · 2 + (1− α)2 · α · 3 + ...
= α(1 + (1− α) + (1− α)2 + ...)2
= α
1
α2
=
1
α
,
and hence C(pwk+1, γ
wk+1) is uniformly bounded by 1α .
(ii) For every k,
δ [1 + (1− z1) + ...+ (1− z1) · · · (1− zk−1)] ≤ αε[1 + (1− α) + ...+ (1− α)k−1]
≤ αε 1
α
= ε.
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This completes the proof of the lemma.
The next result relates the transition probabilities, q and r, to the values of π∗
and π¯, which will be useful for the proof of the main theorem.
Lemma 5.2 For any transition probabilities q, r ∈ [0, 1] with q + r > 0, it holds
that (i) q < r ⇐⇒ π¯ < π∗, (ii) q > r ⇐⇒ π¯ > π∗ and (iii) q = r ⇐⇒ π¯ = π∗.
Proof. It is suﬃcient to show that the following three implications are valid: (i)
q < r =⇒ π¯ < π∗, (ii) q > r =⇒ π¯ > π∗, (iii) q = r =⇒ π¯ = π∗.
Proof of (i). Suppose q < r. In view of (5) and (6), π¯ < π∗ is equivalent to
qV (r) < rV (1− q). (8)
Thus, we have to show that (8) holds. If V (r) < V (1 − q), then (8) is obvious. So
suppose V (r) > V (1 − q). This means that r 6= 1 − q, which together with the
assumption q < r leaves us only two cases: q + r ∈ (0, 1) (the non-oscillating case)
and q + r ∈ (1, 2) (the oscillating case).
Assume q + r ∈ (0, 1) (the non-oscillating case). By (6) we have r < π∗ < 1− q.
Since Anr is monotonically converging to π∗, we have for all n ∈ N, V (r, L) >
V (Anr, L) > V (An+1, L) and lim
n→∞
V (Anr, L) = V (π∗, L), as well as V (r,R) <
V (Anr,R). Hence by property (ii) of Lemma 3.1 we obtain
V (r) = min{V (π∗, L), V (r,R)}.
Similarly,
V (1− q) = min{V (1− q, L), V (π∗, R)}
Since V (π∗, R) > V (r,R), by our assumption V (r) > V (1 − q), inequality V (1 −
q, L) < V (r,R) follows. Hence, by (1) and (2),
1 + qV (r) = V (1− q, L) < V (r,R) = 1 + rV (1− q)
yielding (8).
Assume now q+ r ∈ (1, 2) (the oscillating case). By (6) we have 1− q < π∗ < r.
Due to the facts that A(1− q) > (1− q) and A(1− q) > An(1− q) for all n > 1 we
can conclude that V (A(1−q), L) < V (1−q, L) and V (A(1−q), L) < V (An(1−q), L)
for all n > 1.
Also by (1− q) < An(1− q) for all n ∈ N we have V (1− q,R) < V (An(1− q), R)
for all n ∈ N. Therefore, by property (ii) of Lemma 3.1, V (1 − q) = min{V (A(1 −
q), L), V (1− q,R)} follows.
Similarly to the arguments above, V (r) = min{V (r, L), V (Ar,R)}. Since, by (4),
A(1 − q) < r, we obtain V (A(1 − q), L) > V (r, L). Hence, by V (r) > V (1 − q), we
must have V (1− q,R) < V (r, L) yielding V (1− q) = V (1− q,R). Therefore,
V (1− q) = V (1− q,R) = 1 + (1− q)V (1− q)
Now, we need to analyze two cases: (a) q 6= 0 and (b) q = 0.
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For (a), V (1− q) = 1q . Therefore, in view of property (v) of Lemma 3.1, we may
conclude that qV (r) ≤ qr <
r
q = rV (1− q) which implies (8).
For (b), qV (r) = 0 < rV (1− q), hence (8).
Proof of (ii). Similar to the proof of (i) above.
Proof of (iii). Assume that q = r. Then, as transition probabilities q and r are
equal, the problem is symmetric, and V (p) = V (1 − p) for all p ∈ [0, 1]. Hence, by
(5) and (6), we obtain π = 12 and π
∗ = 12 , hence π = π
∗ follows.
The reader is referred to the appendix for a graphical representation of the
functions V (p, L) and V (p,R) in each of the cases q < r, q = r and q > r.
6 Existence of Thresholds
In this section we will show that we can always find thresholds π1 and π2 such
that the induced strategy γ is (ε-)optimal and successful. We also show that these
thresholds are unique if q = r or q + r ≥ 1. Consequently, we prove for these cases
the uniqueness of the optimal strategy, up to the choices at the two thresholds. The
exact computation of the thresholds follows in Section 7.
In view of Lemma 5.1, it is suﬃcient to prove the following two lemmas.
Lemma 6.1 Take a configuration (p¯, q, r) of initial and transition probabilities with
q ≤ r. Then, there are thresholds π1, π2 ∈ [0, 1] with π1 ≤ π2, π1 < 1 and π2 > 0
such that: searching R is an optimal action for every p ∈ [0, π1], waiting is an
optimal action for every p ∈ (π1, π2), and searching L is an optimal action for every
p ∈ [π2, 1]. Here, the optimal actions are unique up to the choices at π1 and π2. As
usual, p denotes the probability for the object being located at L.
Moreover, if q = r or q + r ≥ 1, then the induced strategy γ never waits infinitely
long.
Also, if q + r > 0, then π2 = π∗.
We will prove this lemma later in Sections 6.1—6.5.
Lemma 6.2 Take a configuration (p¯, q, r) of initial and transition probabilities such
that 0 < q+r < 1 (i.e., the non-oscillating case) and q < r. Then, there is a threshold
π1 ∈ [0, π∗] satisfying π1 < 1 with the following property: For every δ > 0 there is a
τ > 0 such that searching R is an optimal action for every p ∈ [0, π1], waiting is an
optimal action for every p ∈ (π1, π∗ − τ), and searching L is a δ-optimal action for
every p ∈ [π∗ − τ , 1]. Moreover, the induced strategy γ never waits infinitely long.
We will prove this lemma in Section 6.6.
We will now prove Lemma 6.1. We distinguish five cases.
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6.1 Absorbing case: q + r = 0
The fact that q = r = 0 implies directly that the object does not move. Hence,
waiting makes no sense. By searching a location at period 1, one either finds the
object immediately, or one will be sure to find the object next period at the other
location. Therefore, only L is optimal if p > 12 , only R is optimal if p <
1
2 , and both
are optimal at p = 12 . Accordingly, π1 = π2 = π =
1
2 . Note that the optimal actions
are unique up to the choice at 12 , and moreover the induced strategy never waits.
6.2 Non-oscillating case: 0 < q + r < 1
Since q ≤ r, by Lemma 5.2 we have that π¯ ≤ π∗. Define π2 = π∗ and let π1 ∈ [0, π¯]
be the unique p for which V (p,R) = V (π∗, L). Note that π1 is well-defined for the
following reasons: First, V (0, R) = 1 ≤ V (π∗, L) due to the Lemma 3.1, (i). Also,
V (π,R) = V (π,L) ≥ V (π∗, L) due to the definition of π, monotonicity of V (p, L),
and the fact that π∗ ≥ π. Hence, there exists a p ∈ [0, π¯] with V (p,R) = V (π∗, L).
Moreover, since V (p,R) is strictly monotone, there can only be one such p.
Note that π2 > 0 as π2 = π∗ = rq+r , r ≥ q and q+ r > 0. Also, as π¯ < 1 we have
that π1 < 1.
On the interval [0, π1): It holds that V (p,R) < V (p, L) since π1 ≤ π¯. Since
p < Anp for all n, we have that V (p,R) < V (Anp,R) for all n. Moreover, since
Anp < π∗, it holds that V (p,R) < V (π1, R) = V (π∗, L) ≤ V (Anp, L). Therefore, by
Lemma 3.1, (ii), V (p) = V (p,R), and only R is optimal at [0, π1).
It similarly follows that R is optimal at π1 (and waiting as well).
On the interval (π1, π2): We have that V (p,R) > V (π1, R) = V (π∗, L) ≥
V (π∗), and V (p, L) > V (π2, L) = V (π∗, L) ≥ V (π∗). Since, by Lemma 3.1, (iv),
V (p) ≤ V (π∗), it follows that V (p) = V (p, 0), and therefore only waiting is optimal
at (π1, π2).
On the interval (π2, 1]: We know that V (p, L) < V (p,R). Since Anp < p for all n,
we have that V (p, L) < V (Anp, L) for all n. Moreover, since Anp > π∗, it holds that
V (p,L) < V (Anp, L) ≤ V (Anp,R). Therefore, by Lemma 3.1, (ii), V (p) = V (p, L),
and only L is optimal at (π2, 1].
It similarly follows that L is optimal at π2 (and waiting as well).
So, the optimal actions are unique up to the choice at π1 and π2.
Note that if q = r, then π∗ = π¯ by Lemma 5.2, hence π1 = π2 = π∗. Therefore,
the induced strategy never waits.
6.3 State independent transitions case: q + r = 1
The proof for this case is identical to the previous case.
6.4 Oscillating case: 1 < q + r < 2
Since q ≤ r, by Lemma 5.2 we have that π¯ ≤ π∗. Define π2 = π∗ and let π1 ∈ [0, π¯]
be the unique p for which V (p,R) = V (Ap,L). Note that π1 is well-defined for the
following reasons: First, V (0, R) = 1 ≤ V (A0, L) due to the Lemma 3.1, (i). Also,
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since π∗ ≥ π¯, we have V (π¯, R) = V (π¯, L) ≥ V (π∗, L) ≥ V (Aπ¯, L), where the last
inequality follows from the fact that Aπ¯ ≥ π∗. Hence, there exists a p ∈ [0, π¯] with
V (p,R) = V (Ap,L). Now, suppose that more than one p ∈ [0, 1] would exist with
V (p,R) = V (Ap,L). Since both sides are linear functions in p, it must be the case
that V (p,R) = V (Ap,L) for all p ∈ [0, 1]. In particular, 1 = V (0, R) = V (A0, L),
which by Lemma 3.1, (i) implies that A0 = 1, and hence r = 1. Also, V (π¯, L) =
V (π¯, R) = V (Aπ¯, L), which implies that π¯ = Aπ¯, and hence π¯ = π∗. It follows from
Lemma 5.2 that q = r, and hence q = r = 1, which contradicts q + r < 2. So, there
can only be one p with V (p,R) = V (Ap,L).
Note that π2 > 0 as π2 = π∗ = rq+r , r ≥ q and q+ r > 1. Also, as π¯ < 1 we have
that π1 < 1.
It also follows that
V (p,R) < V (Ap,L) for all p ∈ [0, π1), and (9)
V (p,R) > V (Ap,L) for all p ∈ (π1, 1]. (10)
On the interval [0, π1) it holds that V (p,R) < V (p, L) since π1 ≤ π¯. Since
Anp > p for all n, we have that V (p,R) < V (Anp,R) for all n. Moreover, by
(9), V (p,R) < V (Ap,L) ≤ V (Anp, L), where the latter follows from the fact that
Anp ≤ Ap for all n. Therefore, by Lemma 3.1, (ii), V (p) = V (p,R), and therefore
only R is optimal at [0, π1).
It similarly follows that R is optimal at π1 (and waiting as well).
On the interval (π1, π2), we have that V (Ap,L) < V (p,L) since Ap > p. More-
over, V (Ap,L) < V (p,R) by (10). In view of V (p, 0) = V (Ap) ≤ V (Ap,L), it follows
that only waiting is an optimal action at (π1, π2).
On the interval (π2, 1], we know that V (p, L) < V (p,R). Since p > Anp for
all n, we have that V (p, L) < V (Anp, L) for all n. Since π∗ ≥ π¯, we have that
V (π∗, L) ≤ V (π∗, R) = V (Aπ∗, R). Also, V (1, L) = 1 < V (A1, R) as A1 = 1− q > 0.
Since V (p, L) and V (Ap,R) are linear in p, it follows that V (p,L) < V (Ap,R) on
(π2, 1]. Moreover, V (Ap,R) ≤ V (Anp,R) since Anp ≥ Ap for all n. Therefore,
V (p,L) < V (Anp,R) for all n. Together with V (p, L) < V (Anp, L) for all n, it
follows from Lemma 3.1, (ii), that V (p) = V (p, L), and only L is optimal at (π2, 1].
It similarly follows that L is optimal at π2 (and waiting as well).
So, the optimal actions are unique up to the choice at π1 and π2, and the induced
strategy waits at most once.
6.5 Switching case: q + r = 2
In this case, q = r = 1, so the object will surely move to the other location if it is not
found. By searching a location at period 1, one either finds the object immediately,
or one will be sure to find the object next period at the same location. Therefore,
only L is optimal if p > 12 , only R is optimal if p <
1
2 , and both are optimal at p =
1
2 .
Accordingly, π1 = π2 = π = 12 . Note that the optimal actions are unique up to the
choice at 12 , and moreover the induced strategy never waits.
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6.6 Near Optimality in the Non-Oscillating Case: 0 < q + r < 1 and
q < r
We now prove Lemma 6.2. Choose π1 as in Lemma 6.1. Take a δ > 0, and choose
τ > 0 small enough such that π∗ − τ ≥ π¯ and V (π∗ − τ , L)− V (π∗, L) ≤ δ. Such a τ
exists due to Lemma 5.2 (i), and the continuity of V (p, L). On the interval [π∗−τ , π∗]
we have that (1) V (p,R) ≥ V (p, L), (2) Anp converges to π∗ in a monotonically
increasing way, and (3) V (p,L) is decreasing in p. Therefore, by Lemma 3.1 (ii),
V (p) = V (π∗, L) for every p ∈ [π∗ − τ , π∗]. Now, take some p ∈ [π∗ − τ , π∗]. Then,
V (p, L)− V (p) = V (p, L)− V (π∗, L) ≤ V (π∗ − τ , L)− V (π∗, L) ≤ δ,
which means that searching L is a δ-optimal action on [π∗−τ , π∗]. As on the interval
[π∗, 1], searching L is an optimal action (cf. Section 6.2), we obtain that searching L
is an optimal action on the whole [π∗ − τ , 1]. It is clear that the strategy induced by
π1 and π∗ − τ never waits infinitely long.
7 Computation of Thresholds
In this section we derive exact formulas for the thresholds π1 and π2 in Lemmas
6.1 and 6.2. In Sections 7.1 we deal with Lemma 6.1, and also show that π1 ≤ 12
and π2 ≥ 12 , which will imply that the induced strategies only prescribe to search
a location if the probability that this location contains the object is at least 12 . In
Section 7.2 we deal with the computation for Lemma 6.2.
7.1 Computation for Lemma 6.1
Note that for the cases q + r = 0 and q + r = 2 we have already shown that
π1 = π2 = 12 . So, it remains to analyze the cases where 0 < q + r < 1, q + r = 1,
and 1 < q + r < 2. Recall our assumption that q ≤ r. By Lemma 5.2 we know that
π¯ ≤ π∗. Recall that π2 = π∗ = rq+r ≥
1
2 . So, we only need to compute π1 and show
that π1 ≤ 12 .
7.1.1 Non-oscillating case: 0 < q + r < 1
Since q + r < 1, we have π∗ > r, and 1− π∗ = qq+r > q, which implies π∗ < 1− q.
So,
r < π∗ < 1− q.
We distinguish two cases here: (i) r ≤ π1 and (ii) r > π1. We will show that case (i)
corresponds to the case in Table 1 where (q + 1)r2 + q2r − q ≤ 0, and that case (ii)
corresponds to the case where (q + 1)r2 + q2r − q > 0.
Case (i) r ≤ π1. By Lemma 6.1 we know that
V (r) = V (r,R), and
V (1− q) = V (1− q, L) since 1− q > π∗ = π2.
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From equations (1) and (2), it follows
V (r) = 1 + rV (1− q) and V (1− q) = 1 + qV (r),
which implies that
V (r) =
1 + r
1− rq and V (1− q) =
1 + q
1− rq .
Then, by equations (1) and (2) we can write
V (p,R) = 1 + p
1 + q
1− rq and V (p, L) = 1 + (1− p)
1 + r
1− rq .
Recall that π1 is the unique solution to V (π1, R) = V (π∗, L). Since
V (π1, R) = 1 + π1
1 + q
1− rq and V (π
∗, L) = 1 + (1− r
q + r
)
1 + r
1− rq ,
we get
π1 =
q(1 + r)
(q + r)(1 + q)
.
An easy calculation shows that r ≤ π1 if and only if (q+ 1)r2 + q2r− q ≤ 0. Also, it
may be verified that q ≤ r implies π1 ≤ 12 .
Case (ii) r > π1. Since r < π∗, we know from Lemma 6.1 that
V (r) = V (r, 0) = V (Ar).
Since Ar ∈ (π1, π∗), we obtain by induction that
V (r) = V (Anr)
for all n, and hence
V (r) = lim
n→∞
V (Anr) = V (π∗).
As π∗ ≥ π¯, we have by Lemma 3.1, (iii) that V (π∗) = V (π∗, L). Hence,
V (r) = V (π∗, L).
Since 1− q > π∗ = π2, Lemma 6.1 yields V (1− q) = V (1− q, L).
Combining these insights with equations (1) and (2) we obtain
V (1− q) = 1 + qV (r) and V (r) = 1 + (1− π∗)V (r).
From these two equations we get
V (r) =
q + r
r
and V (1− q) = 1 + q q + r
r
.
Recall that π1 is the unique solution to V (π1, R) = V (π∗, L). Since
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V (π1, R) = 1 + π1V (1− q) and V (π∗, L) = V (r) =
q + r
r
,
we obtain that
π1 =
q
(q + r)(1 + q)− q .
An easy calculation shows that r > π1 if and only if (q + 1)r2 + q2r − q > 0.
We will now show that π1 ≤ 12 . If r ≤
1
2 , then π1 < r yields π1 ≤
1
2 . Suppose
now that r > 12 . Let φ(a, b) := a
2 + a(b− 2) + b for all real numbers a and b. Then,
the inequality π1 ≤ 12 is equivalent with φ(q, r) ≥ 0. Notice that, given any b, the
parabola φ(a, b) is minimal at a∗ = 1− b2 . By using that
q < 1− r ≤ 1− r
2
,
we obtain
φ(q, r) > φ(1− r, r) = −1 + 2r ≥ 0,
since r > 12 . Hence, π1 ≤
1
2 .
7.1.2 State independent transitions case: q + r = 1
In this case, π2 = π∗ = r = 1− q. Since q ≤ r, we know that q ≤ 12 . We show that
π1 = q, which will imply that π1 ≤ 12 . By copying the arguments above, we obtain
the following:
Case (i) r ≤ π1. We find that
π1 =
q(1 + r)
(q + r)(1 + q)
=
q(1 + r)
(1 + q)
.
We note that r ≤ π1 and q ≤ r yield q = r, and hence π1 = q.
Case (ii) r > π1. We get
π1 =
q
(q + r)(1 + q)− q = q.
7.1.3 Oscillating case: 1 < q + r < 2
Since q + r > 1, we have π∗ < r, and 1− π∗ = qq+r < q, which implies π∗ > 1− q.
So,
1− q < π∗ < r.
We distinguish two cases here: (i) 1− q ≤ π1 and (ii) 1− q > π1. We will show that
case (i) corresponds to the case in Table 1 where (1− q + q2)r − 2q2 + q3 ≤ 0, while
case (ii) corresponds to the case where (1− q + q2)r − 2q2 + q3 > 0.
Case (i) 1− q ≤ π1. Since π∗ = π2, we know by Lemma 6.1 that
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V (1− q) = V (1− q,R) and V (r) = V (r, L).
From equations (1) and (2), it follows
V (1− q) = 1 + (1− q)V (1− q) and V (r) = 1 + (1− r)V (r).
Hence
V (1− q) = 1
q
and V (r) =
1
r
.
Then, by equations (1) and (2) we can write
V (p,R) = 1 + p
1
q
and V (p, L) = 1 + (1− p)1
r
.
Recall that π1 is the unique solution to V (π1, R) = V (Aπ1, L). Since Aπ1 = (1− q−
r)π1 + r, we have
V (π1, R) = 1 + π1
1
q
and V (Aπ1, L) = 1 + (1− (1− q − r)π1 − r)
1
r
.
This yields
π1 =
q(1− r)
(q + r)(1− q) .
An easy calculation shows that 1− q ≤ π1 if and only if (1− q+ q2)r− 2q2+ q3 ≤ 0.
It can also be verified that q ≤ r implies π1 ≤ 12 .
Case (ii) 1− q > π1. Since π∗ = π2, we know by Lemma 6.1 that
V (1− q) = V (1− q, 0) and V (r) = V (r, L).
As V (1 − q, 0) = V (A(1 − q)) and A(1 − q) > π∗ = π2, we obtain V (1 − q, 0) =
V (A(1− q), L). Since A(1− q) = (1− q− r)(1− q) + r, it follows from equations (1)
and (2) that
V (1− q) = 1 + (1− (1− q − r)(1− q)− r)V (r) and V (r) = 1 + (1− r)V (r).
Hence
V (r) =
1
r
and V (1− q) = q + (q + r)(1− q)
r
.
Then, by equations (1) and (2) we can write
V (p,R) = 1 + p
q + (q + r)(1− q)
r
and V (p,L) = 1 + (1− p)1
r
.
Recall that π1 is the unique solution to V (π1, R) = V (Aπ1, L). Since Aπ1 = (1− q−
r)π1 + r, we have
V (π1, R) = 1 + π1
q + (q + r)(1− q)
r
and
V (Aπ1, L) = 1 + (1− (1− q − r)π1 − r)
1
r
.
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This yields
π1 =
1− r
(q + r)(1− q) + 1− r .
An easy calculation shows that 1− q > π1 if and only if (1− q+ q2)r− 2q2+ q3 > 0.
We will now show that π1 ≤ 12 . As q + r > 1 and q ≤ r, we have r >
1
2 . Let
φ(a, b) := −a2+a(1− b)+ (2b− 1) for all real numbers a and b. Then, the inequality
π1 ≤ 12 is equivalent with φ(q, r) ≥ 0. Notice that, given any b, the parabola φ(a, b)
is maximal at a∗ = 1−b2 . By using that
1− r
2
< 1− r < q ≤ r
we obtain
φ(q, r) > φ(r, r) = −2r2 + 3r − 1 = (1− r)(2r − 1) ≥ 0,
since r > 12 . Hence, π1 ≤
1
2 .
7.2 Computation for Lemma 6.2
We now compute the threshold π∗− τ in Lemma 6.2. Recall that 0 < q+ r < 1 and
q < r. Take a δ > 0, and choose τ := min{π∗− 12 , δ2}. Note that τ > 0 and π∗−τ ≥ 12 .
We know, from Section 7.1.1, that π1 ≤ 12 , and hence π∗− τ ≥
1
2 ≥ π1. Therefore, on
the interval [π∗− τ , π∗] we have that (1) V (p,R) ≥ V (π∗, L), (2) V (p, L) ≥ V (π∗, L),
and (3) Anp converges to π∗ in a monotonically increasing way. Hence, by Lemma
3.1 (ii), V (p) = V (π∗, L) for every p ∈ [π∗ − τ , π∗]. Now, take some p ∈ [π∗ − τ , π∗].
In order to prove that searching L is a δ-optimal action, it is suﬃcient to show that
V (p, L) ≤ V (p) + δ = V (π∗, L) + δ.
We know, by (1), that
V (p, L) = 1 + (1− p)V (r)
and
V (π∗, L) = 1 + (1− π∗)V (r).
Hence V (p, L) − V (π∗, L) = (π∗ − p)V (r). But (π∗ − p) ≤ δ2 by the choice of p.
Moreover, V (r) ≤ 2 by Lemma 3.1, (i). Therefore,
V (p,L)− V (π∗, L) = (π∗ − p)V (r) ≤ δ.
8 Relation to the Model without Waiting
In this section we compare the optimal strategy we determined in the previous sections
with the optimal strategy that Pollock (1970) found for the model without waiting.
We thus evaluate the precise consequence of introducing the option to wait. Recall
that the optimal strategy in Pollock (1970) is given by only one threshold eπ, meaning
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that the agent searches R if p < eπ and searches L if p > eπ, and is indiﬀerent if
p = eπ. We first illustrate, by means of an example from Ross (1983), that in the
model without waiting the agent may search a location that contains the object
with probability less than one half (i.e. eπ 6= 12). Afterwards, we show that Pollock’s
threshold eπ is always in between our thresholds π1 and π2. Consequently, if the agent
searches a location in the model with waiting, he would search the same location in
the model without waiting. Finally, we compare the values of the two models.
8.1 Ross’ Example Revisited
An important implication of our model is that it is never optimal to search the
location with lower current probability of containing the object (See Theorem 2.2).
In the model without the option to wait, as Ross (1983) has shown, it is possible
that searching the location with the lower probability of containing the object is
optimal. In fact, this is a striking result of the model without waiting. This happens
if searching the location with the lower probability of containing the object serves as
an investment for the future, i.e. decreases the uncertainty about the location of the
object in the future. The following example by Ross (1983) shows this.
Example (Ross, 1983) p = 0.45 and 1− p = 0.55, q = 12 and r = 1.
Consider first the model without waiting. Although the initial probability of
location R containing the object is higher, it is optimal to search L since searching
L gives complete certainty about the location of the object at t = 2 in case it is not
found at t = 1. One can see that, in contrast to searching L, searching R at t = 1
leads to complete uncertainty about the location of the object at t = 2, in case it is
not found at t = 1. As a result, the expected cost induced by searching L at t = 1
and acting optimally afterwards (i.e., search L again) is 1.55 and the expected cost
induced by searching R at t = 1 and acting optimally afterwards (i.e., search L, and
if the object is not found then search L once more) is 1.675. In fact, it follows from
Pollock’s calculations that eπ = 0.4 < 12 .
Let’s now introduce the option to wait. Since 1 < q + r < 2 and (1− q + q2)r −
2q2+ q3 > 0 in this example, we see from Table 1 that the thresholds are π1 = 0 and
π2 = 23 . Notice the large diﬀerence with the model without waiting. Hence, at period
1 the agent would wait instead of searching L. After waiting, the probability that the
object is located at L is (0.45)(0.5) + (0.55)1 = 0.775 > π2. Hence, the agent would
search L at period 2. If at period 2, he does not find the object, he will surely find
it in period 3 by searching L. Accordingly, the expected cost of finding the object is
(0.775) ·1+(0.225) ·2 = 1.225, which is less than the expected searching cost without
the option to wait (i.e., 1.55).
8.2 Comparison of Thresholds
We will now explicitly compare our thresholds π1 and π2 with Pollock’s threshold eπ
for the model without waiting. We show that, for any configuration of initial and
transition probabilities, we have π1 ≤ eπ ≤ π2. The computations that follow largely
resemble Pollock’s analysis.
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For the model without waiting, let eV (p) denote the value function, while eV (p, L)
and eV (p,R) the expected costs induced by searching L and R, respectively, given
that the agent behaves optimally afterwards. Then, similarly to equalities (1) and
(2), we obtain
eV (p, L) = p · 1 + (1− p) h1 + eV (r)i = 1 + (1− p)eV (r) (11)
and eV (p,R) = (1− p) · 1 + p h1 + eV (1− q)i = 1 + peV (1− q). (12)
Then, the unique intersection point of eV (p, L) and eV (p,R) is exactly the thresholdeπ, which is given by
eπ = eV (r)eV (1− q) + eV (r) . (13)
Thus, in the model without waiting, only action R is optimal (i.e. eV (p) = eV (p,R) <eV (p,L)) when p < eπ, both actions L and R are optimal (i.e. eV (p) = eV (p, L) =eV (p,R)) when p = eπ and only action L is optimal (i.e. eV (p) = eV (p, L) < eV (p,R))
when p > eπ.
Now we show that, for any configuration of initial and transition probabilities, we
have π1 ≤ eπ ≤ π2. Again, we assume that q ≤ r. We distinguish the following cases.
Case 1. q+r = 0. Recall from Section 6.1 that π1 = π2 = 12 . Obviously, q+r = 0
yields q = r = 0. By eV (r) = eV (0) = eV (0, R) = 1 and eV (1−q) = eV (1) = eV (1, L) = 1,
we obtain eπ = 12 .
Case 2. 0 < q + r < 1. Recall from Section 7.1.1 that r < π∗ < 1− q.
Case 2a. eπ < r. Then, eV (r) = eV (r, L) and eV (1−q) = eV (1−q, L). By r < 1−q, we
then have eV (1− q) < eV (r). Hence, in view of (13), eπ > 12 . As we have already shown
in Theorem 2.2 that π1 ≤ 12 , we deduce eπ ≥ π1. On the other hand, eπ < r < π∗ = π2.
Case 2b. r ≤ eπ ≤ 1− q. Then, eV (r) = eV (r,R) and eV (1− q) = eV (1− q, L). By
(12) and (11), eV (r) = 1 + reV (1− q) and eV (1− q) = 1 + qeV (r),
yielding eV (r) = 1 + r
1− qr and
eV (1− q) = 1 + q
1− qr .
Hence,
eπ = eV (r)eV (1− q) + eV (r) = 1 + r2 + q + r .
Since π2 = π∗ = rq+r , by using that q ≤ r, a simple calculation shows that eπ ≤ π2.
Now we argue that eπ ≥ π1. If π1 ≤ r then we are immediately ready as π1 ≤ r ≤ eπ.
So, assume that π1 > r. Then, as we know from Section 7.1.1, Case (i),
π1 =
q(1 + r)
(q + r)(1 + q)
.
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By using that q ≤ r, a simple calculation shows that eπ ≥ π1.
Case 2c. 1− q < eπ. We show that this case cannot occur. Assume that q > 0,
otherwise we are done. Since r < 1−q, the assumption 1−q < eπ yields eV (r) = eV (r,R)
and eV (1− q) = eV (1− q,R). By (12)
eV (r) = 1 + reV (1− q) and eV (1− q) = 1 + (1− q)eV (1− q),
yielding eV (1− q) = 1
q
and eV (r) = 1 + r
q
.
Hence,
eπ = eV (r)eV (1− q) + eV (r) = q + r1 + q + r .
Since eπ > 1− q, we have
q + r
1 + q + r
> 1− q,
thus q(q+ r) > 1− q. By using q+ r < 1, this implies q > 12 . As r ≥ q, the inequality
q > 12 yields q + r > 1, which is a contradiction.
Case 3. q + r = 1. As 1− q = r, it follows from (13) that eπ = 12 . We know from
Theorem 2.2 that π1 ≤ 12 and π2 ≥
1
2 , so we are done.
Case 4. 1 < q+r < 2. Note that q > 0 and r > 0 must hold. Recall from Section
7.1.3 that 1− q < π∗ < r.
Case 4a. eπ < 1− q. Then, eV (1− q) = eV (1− q, L) and eV (r) = eV (r, L). By (11),
eV (1− q) = 1 + qeV (r) and eV (r) = 1 + (1− r)eV (r),
yielding eV (r) = 1
r
and eV (1− q) = 1 + q
r
.
Hence,
eπ = eV (r)eV (1− q) + eV (r) = 11 + q + r . (14)
We will now show that π1 < 1−q. As we know from Section 7.1.3, this is equivalent
to showing that
(1− q + q2)r − 2q2 + q3 > 0.
As
(1− q + q2)r − 2q2 + q3 = (r − qr − q2) + q2r − q2 + q3
= (r − qr − q2) + q2(q + r − 1)
we must prove that
(r − qr − q2) + q2(q + r − 1) > 0. (15)
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The assumption eπ < 1− q together with (14) yields (1− q)(1 + q + r) > 1, thus
r − qr − q2 > 0. (16)
By (16) and q + r > 1, we have shown (15). Hence, π1 < 1 − q, and Case (ii) of
Section 7.1.3 applies. Thus,
π1 =
1− r
(q + r)(1− q) + 1− r . (17)
Based on (14) and (17), with the assumption q ≤ r, an easy calculation shows thateπ ≥ π1. On the other hand, eπ < 1− q < π∗ = π2.
Case 4b. 1− q ≤ eπ ≤ r. Then, eV (1− q) = eV (1− q,R) and eV (r) = eV (r, L). By
(12) and (11),eV (1− q) = 1 + (1− q)eV (1− q) and eV (r) = 1 + (1− r)eV (r),
yielding eV (1− q) = 1
q
and eV (r) = 1
r
.
Hence,
eπ = eV (r)eV (1− q) + eV (r) = qq + r .
Since π2 = π∗ = rq+r , by using that q ≤ r, we may conclude that eπ ≤ π2.
Now we will argue that eπ ≥ π1. If π1 < 1− q then we are immediately ready as
π1 < 1− q ≤ eπ. So, assume that π1 ≥ 1− q. Then, as we know from Section 7.1.3,
Case (i),
π1 =
q(1− r)
(q + r)(1− q) .
By using that q ≤ r, we obtain
π1 ≤
q
q + r
= eπ.
Case 4c. r < eπ. We show that this case cannot occur. The assumption r < eπ
yields eV (1− q) = eV (1− q,R) and eV (r) = eV (r,R). By (12)eV (1− q) = 1 + (1− q)eV (1− q) and eV (r) = 1 + reV (1− q),
yielding eV (1− q) = 1
q
and eV (r) = 1 + r
q
.
Hence,
eπ = eV (r)eV (1− q) + eV (r) = q + r1 + q + r .
The assumption eπ > r yields q + r > r(1 + q + r), thus q > r(q + r). As q + r > 1,
this implies q > r, which is a contradiction.
Case 5. q + r = 2. Recall from Section 6.5 that π1 = π2 = 12 . Obviously,
q + r = 2 yields q = r = 1. By using eV (1 − q) = eV (0) = eV (0, R) = 1 and eV (r) =eV (1) = eV (1, L) = 1, we obtain eπ = 12 .
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8.3 Comparison of Values
We finally compare the value eV in the model without waiting with the value V in the
model with waiting. Clearly, eV ≥ V always. We will now investigate the situations
where the diﬀerence between the two is minimal and maximal, respectively.
It is intuitive that when q = r = 0 (Case 1) or q = r = 1 (Case 5), we have
π1 = π2 = eπ = 12 and hence eV = V. In those cases, namely, there is no reason for the
agent to wait. Hence, optimal strategies in the model with waiting and the optimal
strategies in the model without waiting coincide.
Now, consider the situation where q = 0, r = 1 (a special case of Case 3). In
this case, the agent would like to wait whenever p ∈ (0, 1), so the waiting region
is maximal here. Now suppose that p¯ = 12 . Then,
eV (12) = 32 , since by searching a
location at t = 1 the agent will find the object immediately with probability 12 , and
otherwise will find the object for sure at location L next period. On the other hand,
in the model with waiting we have V (12) = 1, since by waiting at t = 1 the agent will
find the object for sure at location L next period. We conjecture that the diﬀerence
between the two values can never be more than 12 , so that this would be a case where
the diﬀerence is maximal.
9 Multiple Agents
Now, let’s assume that there are n agents searching for the same object. Similarly
as in the original model, there are three possible actions in each period for every
agent: searching L, searching R and waiting (0). At every period, an agent observes
the actions chosen by his opponents in the previous period, and knows whether the
object has been found or not. As usual, the object is initially at L with probability
p¯, and at R with probability 1− p¯; and it moves according to a finite Markov process
with transition probabilities q and r.
This extension makes the problem a more strategic one, since now the agents not
only compete against time but also against each other in finding the object.7 If agent
i is the first to find the object, possibly at the same time as some of his opponents8,
then his utility would be equal to some prize P (for finding the object first) minus
his total searching cost. If he does not find the object first, he will not receive the
prize P but still incurs the cost of searching. Kan (1977), among others, considered
two natural objectives in a search for a moving target problem: (i) maximizing the
probability of finding the object in a given time, (ii) minimizing the expected cost
for finding the object. These two objectives are, in a sense, embedded in the problem
of each agent in our multiple agents extension. Since only the agents who find the
object first receive the prize, each agent wants to maximize the probability of finding
7Nakai (1986) analyzed a diﬀerent search game with two searchers and n locations, in which the
object does not move. Two searchers with exponential detection functions compete against each
other for a quicker detection of the object. Diﬀerent prior beliefs over locations are allowed. In the
case of identical prior beliefs, he showed that both players have the same equilibrium strategy even
though their detection rates are diﬀerent.
8 The situation changes if the prize is divided amongst the agents who find the object first.
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the object in a given period. On the other hand, each agent wants to minimize his
own expected searching cost.
Recall that in the one-agent case, a strategy was simply a list γ = (γt)t∈N of
actions. This definition is no longer suitable for the multiple agents case. The reason
is that agent i is not certain about the actions of others, and therefore does not
know in advance what action to take at period t. A strategy σi for agent i should
therefore specify for every period t and every possible sequence ht−1 of past actions
some action σi,t(ht−1). Note that the probability pt that the object is at L at period
t is determined by ht−1. A strategy σi is called simple if σi,t(ht−1) only depends on t
and pt. In particular, if σi consists of a fixed sequence of actions (as in the one-agent
case) then σi is simple.
Now, take a profile (σ1, ..., σn) of strategies, one for each agent i. This profile is
called a Nash equilibrium if no agent i can improve his expected utility by unilaterally
changing his strategy, given that his opponents play according to (σ1, ..., σn). The
profile is called a subgame perfect equilibrium if at any period t and given any history
ht−1 of past actions, the players’ continuation strategies in (σ1, ..., σn) constitute a
Nash equilibrium.
We first show that, if P ≥ 2, then typically all subgame perfect equilibria are
symmetric, within the class of simple and strictly loss-free strategies.
Theorem 9.1 Suppose that P ≥ 2. Let pt denote the probability that at period t
the object is at L. Let (σ1, ..., σn) be a subgame perfect equilibrium where σi for each
agent i is simple and strictly loss-free. If pt 6= 12 at every period t after any past play,
then (σ1, ..., σn) must be symmetric.
Proof. Suppose, contrary to what we want to prove, that (σ1, ..., σn) is an asym-
metric subgame perfect equilibrium consisting of simple and loss-free strategies. We
analyze three diﬀerent cases here.
(i) Suppose that at some period t, at least one agent searches L and some other
agent, say agent i, searches R. Assume without loss of generality that pt > 12 . Agent
i’s expected utility from searching R at period t is
uti = (1− pt)(P − 1) + pt(−1),
whereas his expected utility from searching L and always waiting afterwards is
euti = pt(P − 1) + (1− pt)(−1) > (1− pt)(P − 1) + pt(−1) = uti
since pt > 12 . Therefore, agent i would prefer searching L and waiting thereafter to
searching R at period t, which is a contradiction.
(ii) Suppose that at some period t, at least one agent searches L, some other
agent, say agent i, waits, and nobody searches R. Since the strategy of the agent
that searches L is strictly loss-free, we have ptP − 1 > 0. Agent i’s expected utility
from waiting at period t is
uti = pt · 0 + (1− pt)ut+1i ,
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where ut+1i denotes the expected utility from period t+1 onwards. On the other hand,
his expected utility from searching L at period t and copying his original strategy
from period t+ 1 onwards would be
euti = pt(P − 1) + (1− pt)(ut+1i − 1) = pt · P − 1 + (1− pt)ut+1i > uti.
Here we used that the players all use simple strategies. Therefore, agent i would be
better oﬀ by searching L at period t and copying his original strategy from period
t+ 1 onwards, which is a contradiction.
(iii) Suppose that at some period t, at least one agent searches R, some other
agent, say agent i, waits, and nobody searches L. This case is similar to case (ii).
Now, we show that, if P ≥ 2, there is a symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium
in which every agent implements his optimal one-person strategy, given an optimal
strategy exists.
Theorem 9.2 Suppose that P ≥ 2, and q = r or q + r ≥ 1. Take a one-person
optimal strategy σ from Theorem 2.2. Then, there is a symmetric subgame perfect
equilibrium in which every agent uses σ.
Proof. Suppose that the game has reached period t, and that the object has not
yet been found. Let pt be the probability that the object is at L. Let us focus on
agent i, and let V t+1i be the highest utility that agent i could possibly obtain from
period t+1 on, if his opponents play according to σ. We use the following two steps.
Step 1. Assume that σ tells agent i to search a location at period t, say location
L. We show that it cannot be better to wait or to search the other location instead.
We know from Theorem 2.2 that pt ≥ 12 . By searching L at period t, and acting
optimally from period t+ 1 on, agent i’s expected utility from period t on would be
ui = pt(P − 1) + (1− pt)(V t+1i − 1)
= ptP + (1− pt)V t+1i − 1.
If agent i would search R instead at period t, his expected utility from period t on
would be
(1− pt)(P − 1) + pt(−1) = (1− pt)P − 1 ≤ ptP − 1 ≤ ui.
Finally, if agent i would wait at period t, then his expected utility from period t on
would be at most
pt0 + (1− pt)V t+1i ≤ ui
since ptP − 1 ≥ 0. Hence, at period t it is a best reply for agent i to search L.
Step 2. We now show that for agent i it is optimal to use strategy σ if the others
do so as well. Suppose that τ is a strategy for agent i which, at every period t,
specifies an optimal action, given that the others play according to σ, and given that
player i would obtain V t+1i if the object would not be found at period t. Similarly
to Lemma 5.1, part (1), it follows that from every period t on agent i’s continuation
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strategy in τ is a best reply against his opponents’ continuation strategies in σ.9
By step 1, we may assume that, whenever σ prescribes to search a location, then
τ prescribes to search the same location as well. So, the only diﬀerence could be
that at some period σ prescribes to wait whereas τ prescribes to search a location.
This implies that player i’s expected searching cost by using τ is exactly the same
as it would be in the one-person case. Obviously, player i’s expected searching cost
by using σ is also the same as in the one-person case. Since τ cannot yield a lower
expected searching cost than σ in the one-person case, it can also not yield a lower
expected searching cost than σ if the other agents play σ. If agent i plays σ, he will
with probability 1 be the first to find the object. Therefore, τ cannot be a better
reply for agent i than σ. So, it is optimal for agent i to play σ if the others play
σ as well. Hence, if every agent searches according to σ this is a subgame perfect
equilibrium.
In the above theorem, if only ε-optimal strategies exist, then they form a subgame
perfect ε-equilibrium in a similar way.
We now show that, if P ≥ 2, there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium in which
every agent implements the one-person myopic strategy (i.e., search the location with
the higher current probability of containing the object).
Theorem 9.3 Suppose that P ≥ 2. Take a strategy σ that always searches the
location with the highest current probability of containing the object (if both locations
are equally probable, then choose either one). Then, there is a symmetric subgame
perfect equilibrium in which every agent uses σ.
Proof. Suppose that the game has reached period t, and that the object has not
yet been found. Let pt be the probability that the object is at L, and let wt =
max{pt, 1− pt} ≥ 12 . Let us focus on agent i, and let V t+1i be the highest utility that
agent i could possibly obtain from period t + 1 on, if his opponents play according
to σ. Then, by searching the location with the highest current probability at period
t, and acting optimally from period t+ 1 on, agent i’s expected utility from period t
on would be
ui = wt(P − 1) + (1−wt)(V t+1i − 1)
= wtP + (1− wt)V t+1i − 1.
If agent i would search the other location instead at period t, his expected utility
from period t on would be
(1− wt)(P − 1) + wt(−1) = (1− wt)P − 1 ≤ wtP − 1 ≤ ui.
Finally, if agent i would wait at period t, then his expected utility from period t on
would be at most
wt0 + (1−wt)V t+1i ≤ ui
9 The strategies of the opponents of player i will guarantee that the object will eventually be
found with probability 1. Hence the condition with α in Lemma 3 plays no role here.
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since wtP −1 ≥ 0. Hence, at every period t it is a best reply for agent i to search the
location with the highest current probability of containing the object if the opponents
do so as well. Similarly to Lemma 5.1, part (1), it then follows that from every
period t on agent i’s continuation strategy in σ is a best reply against his opponents’
continuation strategies . So, it is a subgame perfect equilibrium.
For two strategy profiles (σ1, ..., σn) and (τ1, ..., τn), we say that the first Pareto
dominates the second if for every agent i his expected utility in the first is at least
as high as in the second. It is easily seen that the subgame perfect equilibrium from
Theorem 9.2 Pareto dominates the one from Theorem 9.3. In fact, the following
corollary proves a more general result.
Theorem 9.4 Suppose that P ≥ 2. Then, the subgame perfect equilibrium (σ1, ..., σn)
in which every agent uses his one-person optimal strategy Pareto dominates all other
symmetric subgame perfect equilibria.
Proof. Take another symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium (τ1, ..., τn). The ex-
pected utility that any agent i would get under (τ1, ..., τn) is equal to his expected
utility from playing τ i in the one-person case. Similarly, the expected utility that
any agent i would get under (σ1, ..., σn) is equal to his expected payoﬀ from playing
σi in the one-person case. Since σi is optimal in the one-person case, agent i’s ex-
pected utility under (σ1, ..., σn) will be at least as high as his expected utility under
(τ1, ..., τn).
The results above are no longer true if P < 2. Consider, for instance, the situation
where the initial probability p¯ is 12 , and the transition probabilities q and r are
1
2
as well. If all players would follow one of the strategies above, then the expected
searching cost for every agent would be exactly 2, and hence it would be better for
every agent to wait forever instead.
If the prize P is chosen large enough then we can prove the following result: Take
a strategy σ which finds the object with probability 1 in every subgame, and never
prescribes to wait. Then, the symmetric strategy profile in which every agent plays
σ will be a subgame perfect equilibrium if P is chosen large enough. Namely, if σ
prescribes to search a location, then searching the other location or waiting will not
be optimal if P is large, since it would yield the risk of not finding the object first. In
particular, it will be a subgame perfect equilibrium if everybody always searches the
location with the lowest probability of containing the object. Note that this behavior
was never optimal in the one-agent case.
10 Discussion
1. Assumption on the Division of P in the Case of Simultaneous Discovery
Note that in Section 9 on multiple agents, we assumed that if multiple agents
find the object at the same time, each receives the prize, P . This assumption
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keeps the case of multiple agents similar to the case of a single agent. If we
assume an equal division of the prize in the case of simultaneous discovery,
there exist values of initial probabilities for which there is no symmetric Nash
equilibrium. This is due to the fact that in this case agents have a higher
incentive to search another location than the others. Therefore, the object will
be found with probability 1 in period 1 in those equilibria. Hence, dividing the
prize equally in the case of simultaneous discovery leads to a more cost-eﬃcient
outcome for the planner compared to the case in which the prize is not divided.
However, if there are many agents then it might be necessary to increase the
lower bound on P to make agents search at all.
2. Ineﬃciency of the Equilibria in the Case of Multiple Agents
From the planner’s point of view, the most eﬃcient strategy profile would be
one in which at t = 1 both locations are searched, which would lead to the
immediate discovery of the object. This, however, cannot be achieved by a
subgame perfect equilibrium in general, except for some cases when the initial
probability p¯ equals 12 .
10
3. Possibility of Overlooking
Weber (1986) and MacPhee & Jordan (1995) analyzed the search for a moving
target problem with a single agent and without waiting in continuous time and
discrete time, respectively. Their models take the possibility of overlooking into
account. Thus, in their models, even if the object is at location L (or R) and
the agent searches that location, he may overlook the object with some positive
probability. This possibility aﬀects the updating process. Now, when the agent
searches a location and cannot find the object, he should take into account
the possibility that the object was in fact at the location he searched. In the
multiple agents case it can happen, for instance, that even though both locations
are searched by diﬀerent agents, the game will not end with probability 1.
4. Existence of Optimal Strategies
In the model without the option to wait, optimal strategies always exist (cf.
Pollock, 1970, and MacPhee & Jordan, 1995). However, as we mentioned in the
analysis above, when waiting is a (costless) option, an optimal strategy may not
exist in the non-oscillating case (i.e., 0 < q + r < 1). Nevertheless, we proved
that for every ε > 0, there exists an ε-optimal strategy.
5. More than Two Locations
The case of more than two locations is much more diﬃcult than the case of
two locations. Even in the case of three locations, one should provide two-
dimensional areas of probability distributions that describe an optimal search
10 Consider the competely symmetric situation where p¯ = 1
2
and q = r. Suppose there are 4 agents.
Then, if agents 1 and 2 search location L while agents 3 and 4 search location R, this will yield a
subgame perfect equilibrium in which the object is found immediately.
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strategy instead of thresholds on a line. (See Nakai (1973) and MacPhee and
Jordan (1995) for some partial results for the model without waiting.)
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Appendix: 3 Sub-cases with respect to the values of π∗ and π
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Figure 9: The functions V (p,L) and V (p,R) when π¯ < π∗ (i.e. q < r)
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Figure 10: The functions V (p, L) and V (p,R) when π¯ = π∗ (i.e. q = r)
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Figure 11: The functions V (p, L) and V (p,R) when π¯ > π∗ (i.e. q > r)
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